Energía, Europa Versus Rusia…
Para los que quieran saber más del tema o sólo leer un análisis a mi juicio muy preciso de la interdepenencia de Rusia con el resto de Europa, les transcribo un artículo aparecido en el International Herald Tribune. Se complementa muy bien con lo indicado en mi post Europa Política Energética = Política Exterior.
Common wisdom says that Europe and Russia are bound by an umbilical cord – energy. EU members are dependent on Russia’s oil and gas, while Russia depends on the enormous export revenues that the European market generates.But over the next decade, both sides have more options than commonly assumed. And as the Georgia conflict vividly demonstrates, for geopolitical reasons each might exercise those options.
The current bond is tight. According to EU statistics, Russia in 2006 supplied 33 percent of EU oil imports and 28 percent of consumption. On the gas side, Russia supplied 42 percent of imports and 27 percent of consumption.
The gas numbers have already risen, and EU dependence on imported gas is set to grow to 68 percent by 2030. But the dependence is mutual, as Russian energy exports account for over 60 percent of Moscow’s export revenues.
Most observers argue that neither side has viable alternatives. That’s true for the next few years. But if Russian-EU relations decay and the Europeans develop more political will, both sides have alternatives over the medium term – 5 to 10 years – that could limit their energy relationship.
Europe could take a number of steps, in many cases by accelerating programs that are already well underway. In isolation, each step would make a marginal difference, but in the aggregate and in the medium-term the EU could reduce its hydrocarbon dependence on Moscow.
On the gas side, the EU already has increased supply from Norway at the expense of Russia. In 2000, Russia supplied 49 percent of EU imports, while Norway stood at 21 percent. By 2006, Russia dropped to 42 percent while Norway grew to 24 percent. And Norway has the reserves to provide increasing volumes to the EU.
Europe is also turning to North Africa for gas. Two pipelines from Algeria and one from Libya provide supply, with plans for another line (Algeria-Italy) moving forward. Libya is the wild card here, as the size of its reserves is uncertain.
Liquified Natural Gas is a significant but expensive alternative for the EU. Europe would have to build significantly more regasification terminals, and then would have to outbid Northeast Asian customers for supply.
It’s also a risky option, as many LNG suppliers carry their own political risk – Egypt, Nigeria and Yemen are good examples. Yet the EU countries already had 14 operational LNG regasification terminals at the end of 2007, with 14 more under construction.
The electricity sector is a key area for EU diversification because natural gas consumption for producing electricity offers a wide range of substitutes. This sector accounts for 31 percent of EU natural gas consumption and natural gas-fired power plants produced 20 percent of EU electricity in 2006.
Increased energy efficiency, wind and solar power, and biomass energy could all displace gas power plants. Nuclear power and clean coal (which remains prospective technology) will also play a role in displacing natural gas, especially in markets such as Britain, Eastern Europe and Italy. A significant EU-wide shift would require a change in some nations on the acceptability of nuclear plants, particularly Germany and Spain, and those facilities have a 5-to-7 year lead time.
On the oil side, the EU could more easily diversify, given the global and highly fungible nature of the oil market. Russian pipelines and ports were built to efficiently serve Europe; disruption of Moscow’s oil exports would cause short-term dislocations that could last weeks and cause global market upheaval as EU importers scramble for seaborne alternatives from other suppliers. But the EU would obtain alternative volumes of oil, if at much higher price.
Russia too has other options for diversifying its export markets – if geopolitical developments drives Moscow to exercise them.
A promising diversification strategy would involve Beijing, should Russia finally elect to implement its much-discussed plans and build large new gas pipelines to China with perhaps a 5-year lead time. Using the new China routes, Russia could divert volumes from Europe and supply China without much additional production.
This scenario would likely be expensive for Russia, given the massive costs of infrastructure development. On the positive side, China is showing greater willingness to pay higher prices for LNG, which indicates increasing demand for imported gas and could lead to an agreement with Moscow on price for Russian pipeline gas.
On oil, the new East Siberia Pacific Ocean pipeline will likely help bring 600,000 barrels per day to Asian markets by 2010, and by late in the next decade Phase II of the project could bring an additional 1 million barrels per day to Asian consumers.
Moscow hopes to find most of this volume in the forbidding climate of East Siberia, and not serve Asia at the expense of Europe. But Russia is politically committed to this line, and if tensions increase it could be an attractive outlet for existing volumes. These oil and gas options are not yet as economically attractive for Russia as European markets, but they are options.
What then could motivate the Russians and Europeans to seek an expensive divorce? Several political flash points could drive the EU and Russia apart.
First, Russia will need to convince Europe that Georgia was a one-time event, and that Ukraine is not next in line for a Russia on the march. Moscow will also need to stabilize relations with Poland and the Baltic states to show the EU that its eastern members are not threatened.
Second, Russia must refrain from using energy as an instrument of politics. Much of the international community believes Moscow used the energy card on Jan. 1, 2006, when it reduced supplies through Ukraine to Europe. Russia could reduce oil flows through the Druzhba line to Poland in response to Poland’s decision to host U.S. missile defense installations. That would set off alarm bells.
Third, Russia defines energy security as security of demand for its producers – meaning acquisition of downstream assets in the European Union.
The strategy has worked well with Germany and Italy; for example, BASF and ENI have received access to the Russian upstream in return for Gazprom obtaining access in Europe’s downstream.
But this model has worked less well with Britain and other countries. In the aftermath of Georgia, stiffer governmental reviews of prospective Russian investment are more likely in the United States – and possibly the European Union.
That could well trigger a backlash from Moscow and impair its energy relations with Europe. Finally, the U.S. retains significant influence with the EU. If U.S.-Russian relations decay even further and Washington turns the screws on Europe, that will have an effect.
Both the EU and Russia have what now look like challenging but doable options. If geopolitical relations decay further, the now sacred EU-Russia energy marriage could be in trouble.
Robert Johnston is director for energy and natural resources at Eurasia Group. Clifford Kupchan is a director at Eurasia Group and a former State Department official.